write:When questioned by a captain for using the rudder in an earlier incident the first officer“insisted that the AAMP directed him to use the rudder pedals in that manner. ” To el

which listedcontributing factors as the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Programand characteristics of the A300-600 rudder system. I heard no reason either during thestaff presentations
or in the explanation provided by the Vice Chairman in submitting hissubstitute
to reverse this order. To diminish the role of the AAMP in the accident is todownplay the role it played in the pilot’s actions which caused the accident. One of theundeniable facts of this accident is the pilot’s inappropriate use of rudder. Staff wasunable to find any example of unusual rudder use by the pilot before his AAMP training.When questioned by a captain for using the rudder in an earlier incident
the first officer“insisted that the AAMP directed him to use the rudder pedals in that manner.” To elevatethe characteristics of the A300-600 rudder system in the hierarchy of contributing factorsignores the fact that this system had not been an issue in some 16 million hours of testingand operator experience—until the AAMP trained pilot flew it. The justification for thechange was that the Board must address the future and
therefore
must give moreattention to the aircraft rudder characteristics. That is what our recommendations aredesigned to do
and our recommendations do address the design issues. The probablecause should reflect accurately what the investigation and the report demonstrate; thesubstitute probable cause does not do that.